Miami is the same before and after September 11
Jesus Arboleya Cervera

February 13th, 2003

 

In general, terrorism is a means used by political groups incapable of forming a genuine popular movement. In the case of Cuba, this was made clear by the extraordinary support given to the Revolution from the very first moments the counter-revolutionary movement showed its true colors.

Conditioned by this fact, the CIA in the 1960s decided to recruit and train hundreds of men in sophisticated techniques of terrorism leaving responsibility for this program to its Miami station - at that time the largest of its kind in the world. It was also the only CIA station within the USA that violated the CIA's own operational rules. As a result, Miami became the capital of the counterrevolution in the US; one of the international centers of drug trafficking and the sale of illegal arms; and a subversive machine of the Cuban émigré community which degenerated into one of the most dangerous terrorist networks on the planet. Organically integrated into the power structure of this enclave, terrorism became a mechanism of social control of the community itself.

What has occurred is not a phenomenon that is peculiar to the creation and development of US society. It is a violence that has been present throughout the history of the USA and terrorism, in particular, has been used for the repression of minorities and the establishment of power groups within ethnic enclaves. In one form or another, in every ethnic enclave groups that espouse violence and terror have established their dominion over the remainder of the community.

This phenomenon came about primarily during the very creation of these enclaves when the classic social pyramid lacked consolidation and mechanisms of social control were quite primitive. Under these circumstances those sectors that aspire to dominate the enclave have to compete with external elements that are often more powerful than they are. Therefore, the continuance of their power requires the absolute submission of their communities, something that is only possible with the systematic use of violence.

In the case of the Cuban-American community this situation was especially apparent in the 1970s coinciding with the consolidation of its enclave and the infighting of counterrevolutionary groups in decline, as well as the first forays of Cuban immigrants into local Miami politics. At this time there were terrorist attacks every week - double that which had occurred in the previous decade - which led local press to describe as a genuine civil war.

In October 1993, the FBI made public a report explaining, among other things, that Cuban-American businessmen had established a network to collect tax-like funds that were later distributed among terrorist groups, and added that "their capacity to provide financial support probably gave them, at least, indirect control over these groups."

The singularity of Cuban-American terrorism, compared to what has happened with other immigrant minorities, is that it has always had a marked political nature and it has developed under the protection and the complicity of the government. As a matter of fact, these groups no longer perform the functions for which they were originally created but now instead serve the interests of U.S. foreign policy - particularly in Latin America - and have even become an instrument of its domestic policy, aimed at controlling its own people.

At the same time, this terrorist infrastructure plays a very important role in local political life, especially during electoral periods. This explains why the candidates fight for it's support or, at least, try not to confront it. Some of the most recent American presidents have played this game and have also benefited from it, particularly George W. Bush, to whom these groups virtually guaranteed the presidential elections in 2000.

By extension, the U.S. government therefore shows no interest in implementing radical measures against Cuban-American terrorism. On the one hand, they play a utilitarian role in Washington's plans against Cuba and other countries, and on the other hand the government is politically committed to these groups since any effort to suppress them would have an enormous political cost. In addition, as already mentioned, this terrorism is part of a mechanism to guarantee the control of the Cuban-American community - a strategic goal of the system with respect to this and all the other minorities.

This situation basically did not change after September 11, although the attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon showed the existing contradiction between the official political discourse and the impunity that Cuban-American terrorism has enjoyed.
The United States has tried to publicize the idea that terrorism constitutes a foreign aggression and not a result of the system. That is why the existence of Cuban-American terrorist groups - as has also occurred with white supremacy groups - has been ignored in the context of the "war against terrorism."

Another problem is that the terrorist infrastructure of Miami - which mingles with other aspects of organized crime in the area - can also serve other domestic and foreign terrorist groups. Bear in mind that, along with the drug trafficking business, Miami is considered one of the main international centers for the illegal traffic of weapons.

Whenever it has been in their interest, the U.S. security services have shown their ability to control these Cuban-American terrorist groups. This has served to limit certain types of actions deemed harmful for the government, and has been based on the historical relation, the political convenience and the impunity to carry out other kinds of activities - even those linked to organized crime. Nevertheless, it is an unstable balance in which the rules of the game may change if the Cuban-American right-wing feels that its supremacy is at stake or the terrorist groups see their space threatened.

At present, the US government will likely try to prevent the Cuban-American terrorist groups from carrying out acts that could interfere with the general guidelines of US policy, but that doesn't mean that all their activities will be suspended - as demonstrated in their already announced new plans against Cuba and their alliances with the Venezuelan opposition.

The terrorist activities of the ultra right-wing Cuban-Americans are not limited to violence - the use of heavy weapons and explosives - but also involve an entire social structure. This is best reflected in the broadcast media, employment opportunities and even people's private lives. I am not referring to the influence traditionally exerted by powerful groups, but to the threats and the daily, direct attacks against anyone who disagrees with the positions of these ultra right-wing Cuban-Americans.

However, there are no signs whatsoever of any true willingness on the part of the US government to effectively prevent or impede the terrorist acts of these anti-Cuba extremist groups. Only a few days after the attacks of September 11th, 2001, and responding to questions specifically asked about the impact of the new situation on the policy toward Cuba, US government spokespersons hastened to affirm that their so-called war on terrorism would not affect Washington's support for these "freedom fighters".

The US government's response to the well-documented information provided by Cuba regarding terrorist acts being plotted and launched out of Miami - an area, in fact, where some of the Al Qaeda terrorists involved in the September 11th attacks were trained - was the arrest of five Cubans who had monitored the activities of these terrorist groups in an attempt to prevent further attacks against Cuba. These five were prosecuted in a trial plagued with irregularities, in which the terrorists, acting as witnesses for the prosecution, took the Fifth Amendment and, as recommended by the District Attorney's office, refused to testify.

Four well-known terrorists of Cuban origin - considered to be among the most dangerous in the entire world - are currently being held in Panama. They had planned an attempt against the life of Cuban President Fidel Castro during a public activity in the context of a meeting of heads of states, where most Ibero-American presidents were also present. The US government has not issued a single statement condemning these terrorists, even though three of them reside in the United States and all are known to have direct links with the CIA.

The US government has feigned ignorance of this whole case - contradicting the tremendous pressure it has exerted on the Panamanian government and the millions of dollars that have been provided to pay a team of defense lawyers considered to be among the most expensive in Panama.

Miami is the same before and after September 11. Regarded as the poorest city in the United States, it is however a safe-house for organized crime, while its local government qualifies among the most corrupt in the country.

Ending the terrorist activities of right-wing Cuban-American groups would require a radical change in Miami that would not serve the interests of the US government. After all, the Miami terrorists have special magical abilities - particularly during elections - such as making ballot boxes disappear and even bringing back the dead to vote.